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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESTITUTION IN THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF CUBA
ROBERT E. FREER, JR.*
"Law and government... seem to propose no other
object but this, they secure the individual who has
enlarged his property, that he may peaceably enjoy
the fruits of it."
Adam Smith, Lectures on
Jurisprudence Notes dated 1766.
"The respect for private property is the cornerstone
of our Judaeo-Christian society."
Jack Kemp, Larry King Live (CNN
television broadcast, Jan. 26, 1993).
I. JNTRODUCTION
H. PROPERTY RIGHTS: RESTITUTION AND COMPENSATION
ll. THE PLAN
A. The Policy of The Cuban Government Should Be to
Return Property to Its Rightful Owners
Senior Principal, Freer & McGanny, P.C., Washington, D.C. Member of the
Bars of Virginia and the District of Columbia. Prepared for the Blue Ribbon
Committee on the Reconstruction of Cuba, May 25, 1993. The author would
like to acknowledge the assistance of Timothy Friedman, whose research for this
article was invaluable. While the author has attempted to be objective, the views
expressed are consistent with the interests of certified claimants represented by
the author who seek the return of their property.
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B. Restitution and Compensation Must Be Rapid to
Assure That the Economy Does Not Stagnate Before
Investment Can Begin
IV. CUBA: THE BEST OF ALL WORLDS
A. Cuba Must Establish a Claims Agency to Deal with
the Claims of Individuals for Restitution






Throughout history, private property has been the core
element of economic success for nations. Respect for the right of
individuals to labor and thereby acquire property motivates and
gives incentive to strive for success. Non-adherence to this
essential principle is a primary cause of the current economic
problems forcing the collapse of communist Cuba's infrastructure.
Dwindling trade and reduced subsidies from the former Soviet Bloc
countries have left Cuba economically isolated and its development
stalled. The absence of foreign support places a tremendous strain
on the Cuban economy and causes catastrophic losses in
productivity.'
Currently there is overwhelming pressure for Cuba to
abandon its centrally controlled economy and convert to a market
1. ELIANA CARDOSO & ANN HELWEGE, CUBA AFTER COMMUNISM 5 (1992).
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based economy.2 Most observers accept that such a conversion
will ultimately occur. When this market-oriented conversion takes
place, Cuba will require a large infusion of capital to stimulate
economic growth and production. With the withdrawal of Eastern
Bloc subsidies and the end of governmental controls from the
centrally managed economic scheme, a free economy will welcome
new private capital. Once again, the forces of free market
competition will determine prices and encourage increased
productivity in the Cuban economy. This will occur only if the
sources of capital believe that the government of Cuba3 is a
reliable partner which will provide stability, order, and respect for
property rights.
When an economy that abruptly departed from free
enterprise principles returns to the market, it will have to find the
capital it needs to stimulate growth. Generally there are two
sources of capital: foreign and domestic. Domestically, the Cuban
treasury is drained, the resources of the citizens are nominal, and
the government is on the verge of bankruptcy. The only feasible
major source is foreign capital.
Central to the legitimacy of any return to a market-based
democracy, and to the confidence of capital markets, is the Cuban
government's recognition that individuals whose property was
confiscated thirty years ago regain legal rights to their property.
These rights must be restored, and the owners should be able to
either reoccupy their property and put it to productive use, or
receive fair compensation for their loss.
4
Also essential to an effective return to a market democracy
2. Spencer Reiss, Requiem for a Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 1993.
3. The purpose of this paper is not to argue for or against any particular
government, but rather to view the situation in terms of immutable principles that
must be adhered to by any Cuban government if the current economic problems
on the island are to be remedied and sustained economic growth achieved.
4. See Domingo Moriera, Issues for Post-Castro Cuba: Privatization, Restitution,
MIAMI HERALD, May 8, 1992, at A17.
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is rapid and efficient adoption of the new system. One observer
noted that "[tlhe important thing is to achieve privatization, not
how it is done,"5 while agreeing that any delay in privatization will
retard recapitalization of the economy and subsequently slow
growth. However, the method of accomplishing privatization is
important. The rights of those whose property was confiscated
must be appropriately recognized if the transformation is to occur.
In light of the competitive markets of the 1990s, the
importance of restitution of or compensation for property, and rapid
privatization and recapitalization in Cuba require that the new
economic system strike a balance between the two interests. Such
a balance will encourage rapid redevelopment of the Cuban
economy in the most effective manner. Only by promptly restoring
confiscated property to its prior owners, and by favoring the return
of property over cash compensation can these needs for investment
be met.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS: RESTrrUTION AND COMPENSATION
"In order for an economic transition to take place, domestic
and foreign investment is required; while uncertainty remains over
land rights and ownership, investment is unlikely. ' '6  Market
economies must view the sanctity of private property rights as a
fundamental tenet in order to give security of ownership to
investors.7  Private ownership drives investment and capital
formation in market economies through individual incentive to
maximize profit. In order to generate substantial investment, it is
critical for a newly forming market-based economy to provide full
assurance that legitimate property rights will be respected. Without
5. Id.
6. MEMORANDUM FROM HERIBERTO LOPEZ ALBEROLA TO MEMBERS OF THE
CUBA TASK FORCE 1, June 12, 1991.
7. Ulrich Drobnig, Privatization of State Enterprises in West Germany, in
PRIVATIZATION IN CENT. AND E. EUROPE 1, 4 (Petar Sarveric, ed., 1992).
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the belief in private ownership, many prospective investors will
hesitate to risk capital where there is a continual threat of loss
through confiscation.
The primary premise for a successful conversion to a
market democracy is this: at a minimum, property rights must be
enforced in the form of compensation for benefit received, but
wherever possible, the government should strive to give full
restitution of the property to those owners who are willing to make
their property economically useful.'
Cuba will encourage the return of foreign investment by
showing from the outset that it will respect legitimate property
rights.9  Conversely, the absence of practical assurances that
property ownership will be respected and that any acquired rights
will not be threatened will slow the return of capital investment.
The government must make investors feel that their property is safe
from arbitrary takings.
The most effective way to convince the economic
community that Cuba will respect property rights is to follow the
generally applicable provisions protecting private property which
appear in the constitutions of most nations. These provisions were
in effect at the time the communists took over the Cuban
government. Under the Cuban Constitution of 1940, property rights
were protected against unlawful takings.10 Therefore, property
that was confiscated should now be restored to its rightful owners.
Adherence to the generally accepted commercial principles and pre-
existing Cuban law will demonstrate Cuba's respect for the rule of
its own law as well as the rights of individuals to own property in
the market-based economy.
8. Moreira, supra note 4, at A17.
9. Cuban American National Foundation, Promoting Trade and Investment in
Post-Castro Cuba: Interview with Sergio Leiseca, CUBA SURVEY, at 7 (Oct.
1992).
10. CONSTITUcI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA, art. 24, § 1 (1940).
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I. THE PLAN
There are three central themes which should be
contemplated in a system for restitution of property. First, with
respect to economically productive property, restitution should be
the rule and compensation should be the exception." Second,
restitution of property should be the primary method of
privatization in order to encourage confident investment in property
that has clear title. Rather than having a slow industry
privatization scheme which inhibits the natural expansion of a free
market economy, a macroeconomic privatization is more
appropriate. Third, former owners should have the opportunity to
elect compensation over restitution. Unfortunately, compensation
would lag behind a restitution plan because of the cash poor
position of the Cuban treasury. The goal is to initially recognize
the free market as the preferred method of conducting transactions.
Thus property owners who want cash might be compensated based
on the market price at a state auction of the property. A policy
where property rights will either re-vest in the last recorded owner
or be transferred in favor of compensation will permit title to any
property to be clear of claims and will allow investment without
risk of loss due to worthier title.
A. The Policy of the Cuban Government Should Be to Return
Property to Its Rightful Owners
Cuba should place a high priority on restitution of
productive resources to previous owners. A number of countries
have enacted laws providing for the return of confiscated property
11. See GEMEINSAME ERKLARUNG DER REGIERUNGEN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND UND DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK ZUR
REGELUNG OFFENER VERMOGENSFRAGEN [JOINT DECLARATION OF THE FRG AND
GDR ON THE SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS]
[Hereinafter JOINT DECLARATION ON PROPERTY RIGHTS], June 15, 1990; see also
Dorothy A. Jeffress, Resolving Rival Claims on East German Property Upon
German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527, 545.
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to the previous owners. "Although their programs vary, the
principle is the same: property should be returned to private
ownership.' 12 For example, the Baltic Republics have recognized
the need to create a market economy based on investment, and
should have opted to return all confiscated property. Cuba should*
adhere to this principle.
Restitution of confiscated properties in Cuba will indicate
to past and prospective investors that once they have invested in
Cuba, the government will not disregard their legitimately
established rights. However, in return for restitution of key
industrial or commercially significant properties, the government
could require a commitment from these property owners that they
will make their property economically useful and productive.
God gave the world to men in common; but since
he gave it to them for their benefit and the greatest
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from
it, it cannot be supposed He meant it should always
remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the
use of the industrious and rational - and labor was
to be his title to it - not to the fancy or covetousness
of the quarrelsome and contentious."3
The imposition of requirements by the government on
previous owners places an added burden on the rights of these
proprietors. To the extent that such demands are inconsistent with
unfettered rights to private property, the critical need of the Cuban
people to jump start the economy could be a sufficient justification,
provided that the owner's right to request compensation, in lieu of
12. Michael Hiltzik, Reclaiming the Past in the Baltics, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1991, at 1.
13. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
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return of the property remains protected. 4 This process enables
the individual to elect to receive compensation rather than to
comply with these requirements, permitting an acceptable choice
between balanced interests.
A restitution plan which returns property to its former
owners, and a commitment from those owners of economically
strategic properties to make them fully productive, would
encourage these investors to develop property to its maximum
social value; such a plan therefore serves as a powerful means of
resurrecting a faltering economy. In the case of Cuba, where many
of the investors are eagerly waiting to return and reinvest,
recapitalization is likely to be rapid. In some cases, however,
owners will simply want to get their property back and hold on to
it while it appreciates. In these cases, where strategic industrial
property is involved, there may have to be a compromise between
the rights of these owners to do what they want with their property
and the competing need for the revival of the Cuban economy. For
key industrial, commercial, or recreational property, this exercise
of.the right of property ownership may have to be tempered by the
needs of the Cuban people to spur the economic growth of the
Cuban economy, but only within the framework of full
compensation.
Restitution is "the natural law" and should be the general
rule with respect to previous confiscation of private property.
However, the plan should also contemplate the possibility that the
nature of the property's use may have changed, thereby making
14. See 1989. evi XIII torveny a gazdalkodo szerveztek esq gazdasagi tarasgok
a talakulasarol [Hungary Act No. XII of 1989 on Transformation of Economic
Organizations and Companies] [Hereinafter Hungary Economic Act] (Requiring
the negotiations between the government and the prospective purchase of a
company to commit a minimum of 20% of the value of the company to initial
investment); see also Tamas Sandor, PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE 23, 26 (Petar Sarcevic, ed., 1992).
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restitution impracticable."5 Priorities of use are essential to
privatization. If many individuals are dislocated at the expense of
business owners, the individuals suffer and the political legitimacy
of the government becomes suspect. Indeed, the very success of
the economic conversion could be placed at risk by the consequent
loss of political consensus.
Privatization in the Baltic Republics illustrates the problems
inherent in failing to recognize changed circumstances. Their
radical restitution process, which returns all property to its pre-
Soviet occupation status in spite of any changed circumstances,
"will create serious economic and possibly political dislocations,
and since all three Baltic countries suffer from severe housing
shortages, finding new homes for displaced tenants could take
years." 1 6  A situation where massive displacement occurs is
clearly not in the best interest of the Cuban people. The well-being
of natural citizens must be recognized and protected in any
restitution scheme.
In sharp contrast to the Baltic States' restitution plan, the
German system "allows restitution to be excluded by [a change in]
'the nature of things."' 17 Certain scenarios where circumstances
have changed must be contemplated in evaluating the applicability
of restitution in a given case. For example, in cases where
property has been converted to residential use, the residents should
not be forced to abandon their homes. In these cases, restitution
15. I have been asked what change qualifies to make restitution impracticable.
Ultimately the Cuban people will have to decide this, but a standard that is so
high it discourages reinvestment or appears inconsistent is not in Cuba's interest.
The change contemplated by this article might include conversion from industrial
to residential, or an expansion of one economic use to include adjacent property.
Here, competing claims would appear to favor the return to the owner best
equipped to operate the facility and willing to buy out the conflicting rights.
16. Hiltzik, supra note 12, at 1.
17. Drobnig, supra note 7, at 8 (quoting the Law on Open Property Issues).
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is not a viable solution, and an alternative plan must be devised. 8
There are two possible solutions to the cases where
restitution is inappropriate. First, these owners may choose to
acquire other property of equal value in Cuba as if they had
reacquired their own property, subject to the applicable investment
requirements. Second, the former owners may be compensated for
their property in cash or a cash equivalent. Effectively, displaced
investors have the right to purchase property before it is offered to
the public. 19 The second option is more helpful to economic
conversion because it guarantees additional capital investment and
will cost the government less than other forms of compensation.
In the short term, it is unlikely that Cuba, with a depleted treasury,
would be able to compensate each owner in cash for all of the
property that it confiscated.20  By offering property to previous
owners who are willing to accept the responsibility to make it fully
productive, Cuba will infuse critically needed capital into the
economy2' and avoid the debt burden that would be incurred by
paying for all of the property taken by the communists.22
Restitution of productive property to those investors, foreign
or domestic, willing to infuse capital to develop an industry is in
the best interest of the Cuban people. The instant stimulus that
investment creates will generate employment and opportunity for
18. Jeffress, supra note 11 at 544. (Similarly, however, changed circumstances
should not justify occupation of a mansion on the basis of long-term residency
alone.)
19. See Property Compensation Law to Take Effect in Hungary, INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA), Aug. 7, 1991.
20. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Eastern European Models for Cuban
Foreign Restitution Claims, FREE MARKET CUBA Bus. J. 5 (Winter 1993).
21. Ferdinando Targetti, The Privatization of Industry with Particular Regard to
Economies in Transition, in PRIVATIZATION IN EUROPE 1, 10 (Ferdinando
Targetti, ed., 1991).
22. Shaw et al., supra note 20, at 6.
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increased productivity. Cuba is currently in dire need of productive
enterprises that will generate a continuous output of exportable
goods that can be marketed throughout the world. Private
investment in Cuba is the way to create jobs and provide necessary
staples to all Cuban citizens.
B. Restitution and Compensation Must be Rapid to Assure
That the Economy Does Not Stagnate Before Investment
Can Begin
While respect for property rights and restitution of
confiscated property are essential elements in the privatization of
property in Cuba, to some degree the restitution process will inhibit
the rapid privatization of property. Forcing claims into the courts
could cause a lengthy delay between the claim and the actual
vindication of title. While this delay has not discouraged Germany,
other countries, including Hungary, have adopted a system of
compensation for confiscated property without an option of
restitution. These systems were adopted in the hopes that mass
auctioning of property in the short term would result in immediate
investment. The "Law to Provide Partial Compensation for Unjust
Damage Caused by the State to the Property of Citizens" was
passed on July 11, 1991 to this effect.23
Hungary's program is efficient in clearing titles, but it
creates a number of problems. First, there is the problem of
finding the resources to pay for all of the property claims. Due to
the former communist regime, there is a stagnation in monetary
liquidity which in turn hinders compensation. Second, the program
is inflationary. Third, total compensation creates the same time
problems as restitution does with respect to initial capital
investment. Since the owners will have to go through the
additional step of litigating their rights in property that is auctioned
off, they will not be able to invest until they receive funds with
which to pay. The "credit vouchers" which are being distributed
23. Drobnig, supra note 7.
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do not fill the void. On the contrary, instead of generating capital,
credit vouchers simply award individuals ownership rights in
property. Realistically, there is little or no advantage to a
compensation scheme based on mass auctioning of property.
Germany, on the other hand, has operated under a system
which prefers restitution above compensation. The German system
illustrates that restitution can be the basis for a rapid privatization,
provided an appropriate time limit is instituted in order to deal with
claims. On July 11, 1990, the former German Democratic
Republic [hereinafter GDR] issued a decree on the Registration of
Property Claims.24 Initially, this decree set up a deadline of
January 31, 1991 for applications for the restitution of confiscated
property. This deadline was later changed to October 13, 1990.
"The short deadline was set in the interest of settling property
issues quickly, a prerequisite to GDR economic development."2
5
Despite the fact that this change in policy will preclude some
potential claimants from restitution, Germany has determined that
the need for immediate investment outweighs the potential benefits
that additional time to claim would provide.26
Cuba's system should emulate the German system of
restitution. All claims for restitution of property must be filed by
the early deadline. This deadline should be similar to the German
model which provides a period of six months from the time of the
announcement of the decision to convert. After this time period
24. Verordnung fiber die Anmeldung vermbgensrechtlicher Anspriiche [Ordinance
Regarding the Registration of Property Claims], July 11, 1990.
25. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NOTICE CONCERNING CLAIMS AGAINST PROPERTY
IN THE GDR, at 1 (1991).
26. Czechoslovakia has adopted a system of privatization which lies somewhere
between the German and the Hungarian systems. This scheme has returned a
limited amount of farmland or provided compensation to the previous owners.
The Czech government has attempted to blend limited restitution into an
overriding compensation plan through compensation for other takings and
subsequent auctions of the property.
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lapses, the only claims that should be recognized are for
compensation of property value at the time of the confiscation.27
Failure to file by the German deadline is not a total
forfeiture of all rights in the confiscated property. Rather, it is
interpreted as an election for property compensation if the claim is
valid. A program of this sort forces an early decision so that
property can be disposed of efficiently, but it does not cut off all
rights of previous owners. This procedure encourages investment
and assures subsequent purchasers of property that their title is
clear of any claims for restitution.
Invariably, there will be instances where the right to the
return of property will block or inhibit investment because of the
potential for multiple claims on the same property. Such is the
nature of permitting claims of valid title. On the other hand,
restitution indicates that the Cuban government has a high degree
of respect for private ownership of property. It will also encourage
a continuing flow of investment in the future. A delicate balance
must be achieved. Fortunately, Cuba can benefit from the study of
the Eastern European models.
IV. CUBA: THE BEST OF ALL WORLDS
Cuba's relationship with the United States is unique. The
proximity of the island nation to Florida, historically close
commercial ties, and the large Cuban exile population in the United
States create opportunities which do not exist in liberated Eastern
European countries. Cuba should learn from the various setbacks
that have plagued the Eastern European countries in their property
distribution systems and adopt the most favorable mechanism.
27. See Gesetz zur Regelung offener Verm igensfragen [Law Regulating Open
Property Issues] Annexed to the Unification Treaty of Aug. 31, 1990.
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A. Cuba Must Establish a Claims Agency to Deal with the
Claims of Individuals for Restitution
"To privatize state-owned assets and to make certain that
previous owners recover their property or receive compensation, the
Cuban government would do well to establish a privatization
oversight agency and a property claims court., 28 In order to clear
title quickly, Cuba must set up an agency to address and resolve
claims for restitution of property. The "Agency" should be
independent of the government and have one purpose: to resolve
property claims and declare ownership. This single function will
avoid the problems that have plagued Germany in attempting to
administer the claims system for former East German property.
The predominant problem in Germany has been an unwieldy
adjudication system. Germany found that using a decentralized
bureaucracy to adjudicate claims was not effective. While the
Treuhandanstalt dictates the standards for claims recognition, the
local courts throughout the republic hear the claims cases to
determine their validity. This has been tremendously inefficient.29
To avoid such inefficiency, an independent court system can be set
up throughout Cuba to deal with the claims.
The claims agency should produce a set of clear guidelines
instructing the courts on how to prioritize competing uses. "The
most important factors in setting a policy to resolve property claims
are fairness, predictability, stability, and the public interest."3 °
This agency should begin with the premise that restitution of
ownership is the rule, and compensation for lost property is the
exception. Certain provisions for changed circumstances should be
instituted, and the relative values of uses should be prioritized.
28. Bryan T. Johnson, Preparing For a Free Market Cuba, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, No. 890, Apr. 8, 1992, at 6.
29. Jeffress, supra note 11, at 543.
30. Id. at 529.
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Residential property must be of the highest value. Agricultural
property should also rank highly because of the need for a steady
food supply during the short-term transitional hardships.
Productive industrial uses and small proprietorships should receive
priority immediately after residential and agricultural uses. The
key to the process is to allow restitution when the proposed use is
compatible with the interests of the Cuban people,31 and allow full
compensation when it is not. Therefore, all individuals in Cuba
will be provided for, and investment opportunities will only be
minimally restrained.
In addition to strict guidelines for the claims courts, the
second aspect of the Cuban Claims system should be to set a rigid
timetable for resolving property claims. In order to assure free
alienability and clear title, all rights and ownership interests must
be resolved as soon as possible. Claims should be heard promptly,
and in exceptional circumstances claimants with valid claims
should be granted their property subject to investment
guarantees. 32  For the strategic properties requiring follow-up
investment, the program must be rational. By making investment
requirements too strict, qualified owners will be discouraged from
returning to their property. These owners could instead choose
compensation, and deplete the potential investment in the economy.
Cuba might have to sweeten the deal for investors to counteract
this problem.3
31. Id. at 545.
32. MORIERA, supra note 4, at 1.
33. Professor Roger E. Betancourt, at the University of Maryland suggests that
Cuba should insulate new investors from environmental damage liability inflicted
by their predecessors, or have the current government managers streamline
industries before the new owners come in, so as to minimize the shock of foreign
or domestic restructuring. Telephone interview with Dr. Roger Betancourt,
Professor of Economics, U. of Maryland (Jan. 27, 1993).
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B. Foreign Claims Will Be Distinguishable From Citizen
Claims
Foreign claims can be addressed in much the same way as
Germany dealt with U.S. claims with respect to former East
German property, but with some modification. The U.S.-German
claims agreement established a $190 million fund from which valid
claims of U.S. citizens would be paid. Owners with claims may
forego compensation from the claims fund in favor of litigating
their claims in Germany in an attempt to get their property
returned.
In spite of the general preference for restitution, Germany
decided that the U.S. compensation fund should encourage election
for compensation. For Germany, this is an acceptable solution,
because there are ample West German marks available to finance
the fund. Cuba is in a more precarious financial position. Its
treasury is already depleted, and there is no way to pay for all of
the potential claims in cash. An alternative funding vehicle is the
issue of compensation bonds which will mature in a number of
years in lieu of cash compensation.34 It is unlikely that either of
these options will be attractive to former property owners.
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission [hereinafter
FCSC] was authorized by Congress in 1964 to determine the
validity of Cuban claims from owners based in the United
States. 35 The FCSC adjudicated 8,816 United States-based claims
between 1967 and 1972 and certified 5,911 of them as valid.36
Since determinations have been made as to the validity of these
claims, it is in the interest of rapid privatization to allow election
out of a compensation fund, similar to the German system. It is
important to consider, however, that the more Cuba has to pay, the
34. Jeffress, supra note 11, at 547.
35. 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1964).
36. Shaw et al., supra note 20, at 5.
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more it will deplete its cash reserves, so it may be forced to go into
debt.
Cuba is better served by encouraging investment in
property, rather than compensating individuals for it. The option
for compensation can be provided, but in contrast to the German
preference, the Cuban system should discourage compensation in
favor of restitution and investment.
C. Political Considerations
Cuba is uniquely situated relative to other democratizing
countries in its ability to make its transition to a market system
smoothly and rapidly. The close proximity to the United States
and the apparent willingness of Cuban-American exiles to work
with any democratic government not led by Fidel Castro,37 could
make economic development easier. Much has been published
supporting a high level of investment interest in a free market
Cuba. A large number of exiles intend to return to Cuba with
plans to contribute to a stable political system and a rich economic
base for the country.
While there is mixed information regarding the intentions
of some exiles to return permanently to Cuba, there is a great deal
of interest both in the United States and abroad in potential
investment in Cuba. Currently, this interest can be seen in the
form of joint venture hotels and resorts which are springing up in
Cuba.39 These European based corporations are already investing
37. Johnson, supra note 28, at 1.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Robert Corrigan, Investment Ideas for the Fidel-Free Cuba, INvESTORS Bus.
DAILY, Oct. 30, 1991, at 1.
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in ventures with the Cuban government.4° There are other
potential sources of investment. A number of companies have
expressed great interest in the investment opportunities in a post-
Castro Cuba. Reportedly among the most interested are Carnival
Cruise Lines, Hilton Hotels, and numerous airlines.4' Cuba is in
a prime geographic location for the U.S. tourism industry. A major
concern, however, is the possibility that the political situation in
Cuba will not be stable enough to support a viable tourism
industry. Sustaining a stable political environment depends upon
the strength and ability of the government to provide basic
supplies, food, and services to its citizens. Without a stable
political situation, transformation of the Cuban economy is in
jeopardy.
The situation in Cuba is a stark contrast to the situations in
Central and Eastern Europe, where a majority of the citizens cannot
remember what it was like to operate a market economy. Cuba has
been a communist system for one generation, and many of the
citizens recall the way the economy functioned. Cuba's population
is acutely aware of the dynamics of a market economy and will be
better prepared to adapt to the system. Further, Cuba's current
needs have forced it to mimic capitalism with regard to foreign
investment agreements.42 The single greatest advantage to having
a population that remembers the economy as a free market is that
restitution and privatization will be faster, and the ability of the
40. This is inadvisable at the moment because it is unclear whether, following
any change in the control of the Cuban government, these ventures will be
respected in their current form as having legally invested in Cuba. While there
is a diversity of political opinion within the exile community, they are unified in
their opposition to the present development of confiscated property by the Cuban
government and joint venture partners. See PRELIMINARY REPORT BY THE BLUE
RIBBON COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF CUBA, Sec. I, at
12, June 1991.
41. Benneton in Cuba, THE FINANCIAL POST: INTERNATIONAL BRIEFS, at 8.
42. Shaw et al., supra note 20, at 1.
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economy to provide for all who need resources will be enhanced.
Since a relatively short period of time has passed, there is
still a substantial portion of the original infrastructure left from
Cuba's previous market economy. Additionally, Cuba invested
government resources in a number of new industries, with
particular emphasis on biotechnology. The infrastructure for
industry will facilitate the transition to an efficient economy.
People want to invest in Cuba. Many see the opportunity
to get in on the ground floor by reclaiming their property or by
buying property that will remain unclaimed. The possibility that
Cuba will become an unstable political system and an investment
risk not only for tourism, but also for industry, is a growing
concern. The government must ensure that the political system is
secure and that property rights are not only free from potential
confiscation by the government, but also free from the risk of loss
due to political upheaval.
D. Social Considerations
There is always the possibility of hostility when perceived
outsiders move into someone's native land. In the Baltic States,
there has been tremendous tension between those who are returning
and retaking their property and those who are being temporarily or
permanently displaced.43 While the dislocation in Cuba will not
be as dramatic, the feeling of invasion will not dissipate
immediately. This potential for social unrest makes it essential that
companies who are committed to providing capital and jobs
immediately lead the investment movement. When people are
employed and have the financial ability to consume, they generally
accept government policy; when people are unemployed, the risk
of social unrest grows.
As with any market-based system, the natural
43. Hiltzik, supra note 12, at 3.
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unemployment rate lies between four-to-six percent." Cuba must
take care to be an exception in transition. While many in Cuba are
not "employed" as the term is used in a free economy, citizens of
a communist system are not accustomed to unemployment as a
concept, because of the policy of 100% guaranteed employment.
While the transition will be cushioned by familiarity with the old
market system, it is imperative that Cuba maintain unemployment
at or below this natural minimum. To that end, investment is the
initial key to reduce unemployment and maintain the low rates
through development.
The bottom line consideration in restitution and privatization
of property is not to make the Cuban people suffer while bickering
over property rights. Cuban nationals are not to blame for the
dilemma, so they should not be made to suffer for the mistakes of
their government. To tie up property rights while the debate over
true ownership is litigated would only penalize the innocent
citizens of Cuba. While they wait for the rights of prospective
owners to be resolved, unemployment will remain high and
productivity will remain low.
There should be little debate over who owns property in the
short run. If the claims cannot be resolved quickly and restitution
cannot be granted, then the property should be divested and
sold.4' The ownership rights may be reviewed later and
compensation may then be granted. This is the only way to
prevent the extended suffering of Cuban citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
Cuba needs to institute a rapid macroeconomic change to a
market economy. Problems experienced by the Eastern European
44. ANDREW B. ABEL AND BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICs 735
(Addison-Wesley 1992).
45. This should not be allowed to serve as an excuse for allowing frivolous
claims to force divestment of valuable property.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESTITUTION
countries in their rocky transitions to market systems should be
avoided. Cuba must move quickly to remove the barriers to
investment and enable the economy to grow and mature. Both
foreign and domestic capital is needed to insure adequate funding
for continued growth.
The system Cuba adopts should encourage long-term
investment commitments which will prevent capital depletion.
Provided both social and political elements are reconciled in a form
that is acceptable to citizens and investors alike, these favorable
conditions will flourish.
Cuba must become an attractive investment for business.
This can be achieved if the conversion to a market economy is
centered in a restitution program that will allay the fears of
investors. Respect for law and property rights is the key to foster
investor confidence and to ensure economic stability for Cuba's
future.
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